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have led to complaints that the 
FDA does not do enough to keep 
unsafe  devices  off  the  market. 
The failure of some devices, such 
as implantable defibrillators, could 
pose deadly risks.
Fundamental  differences  be-
tween  devices  and  drugs  have 
important implications for FDA 
regulation. A typical device is an 
engineered product, rather than 
a chemical compound like a con-
ventional drug or a biologic agent. 
The effects of a minor modifica-
tion in the structure of a drug 
are rarely predictable enough to 
obviate the need for clinical trials. 
In contrast, the effects of modi-
fications of devices are often pre-
dictable. A screw can be changed, 
a battery redesigned or replaced 
with a longer-lasting alternative. 
A series of small changes, how-
ever, can collectively lead to entire-
ly new functions and, potential-
ly, risks. Pacemakers, for example, 
have  much  more  sophisticated 
capabilities than they did 20 years 
ago, and arguably, the defibril-
lation  and  cardiac-resynchroni-
zation capabilities of devices to-
day  are  the  result  of  multiple 
incremental changes in pacemak-
er technology. At what point does 
a modification of a device war-
rant  an  entirely  new  approval 
process? And who should make 
that decision?
Waiting until a device is fro-
zen in final form before seeking 
FDA approval could lead to very 
long delays in product introduc-
tion  and  discourage  companies 
from making improvements after 
approval.  Without  new  clinical 
studies, it is not easy to deter-
mine  whether  an  incremental 
change in a device increases risk 
or impairs effectiveness. But treat-
ing  every  modification  as  the 
equivalent of a new drug would 
make incremental improvements 
prohibitively time-consuming.
For regulatory purposes, the 
FDA  classifies  medical  devices 
into three categories. Most class 
I and II devices, which are con-
sidered low risk, require only a 
“premarket  notification”  or  a 
510(k) clearance to be marketed. 
Clinical  trials  to  show  safety 
and efficacy are unnecessary for 
the  510(k)  clearance.  Class  III 
devices,  which  are  considered 
high  risk,  can  receive  a  510(k) 
exemption if they can be shown 
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T
he Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is 
known for its rigor in regulating drugs, not  
devices. That may be about to change. In recent 
years, well-publicized device recalls and lawsuits 
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to  be  “substantially  equivalent 
to [a device] legally in commer-
cial  distribution  in  the  United 
States.”  1  High-risk  devices  that 
are not eligible for such an ex-
emption  must  undergo  a  full 
premarket-approval (PMA) evalu-
ation. Like the new-drug applica-
tion process, PMA requires results 
from clinical studies showing a 
product’s safety and efficacy.
Criticisms of the FDA’s scru-
tiny  of  devices  center  on  two 
major claims: that the 510(k) ex-
emption is used too freely and 
that the full PMA review is not 
stringent enough. For instance, 
the FDA argued last year that un-
der the previous administration, 
the 510(k) process was used in-
appropriately to allow the Mena-
flex knee implant to be marketed.2 
And  the  Government  Account-
ability  Office  reported  that  in 
fiscal years 2003 through 2007, 
more class III devices were given 
a  510(k)  clearance  than  went 
through  an  original  PMA  pro-
cess  (see  graph).  These  experi-
ences are among the reasons why 
the Institute of Medicine has con-
vened a committee to review the 
510(k) exemption.
Some high-profile failures have 
also occurred in devices that un-
derwent PMA evaluations. A series 
of lawsuits alleged that implant-
able defibrillators manufactured 
by  Guidant,  which  was  subse-
quently  purchased  by  Boston 
Scientific, discharged inappropri-
ately or failed to fire when need-
ed, placing recipients at risk for 
sudden death. Med  tronic had also 
gone through a PMA process be-
fore introducing its Sprint Fidelis 
defibrillator leads. After reports 
began to indicate that the leads 
could fracture, patients faced a 
wrenching dilemma: they could 
undergo risky procedures to re-
place the leads or, as the compa-
ny advised, leave them alone and 
simply live with the ever-present 
danger  of  sudden,  catastrophic 
failure. Litigation ensued.
Product-safety  litigation  has 
long  complemented  regulatory 
oversight in deterring the sale of 
unsafe  medical  devices.  But  in 
its  2008  decision  in  Riegel  v. 
Medtronic, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled  that  because  federal  law 
preempts state laws, makers of 
medical devices that have received 
FDA approval cannot be sued over 
product  defects  in  state  courts 
(where tort litigation must take 
place). The suit had been brought 
over a balloon catheter that burst 
while being inserted into a coro-
nary artery, but the ruling applies 
to  all  devices  that  have  under-
gone the PMA process. Consumer-
safety advocates and other critics 
of  FDA  regulation  of  medical 
devices, along with members of 
Congress,  were  dismayed  that 
harmful devices that have passed 
any FDA review — even an inad-
equate one — will no longer be 
subject to the threat of legal ac-
tion in state courts.
The loss of the ability to sue 
might have been less troubling 
if the PMA process were consis-
tent and stringent. But critics ar-
gue that it is neither. A recent 
study concluded that of 78 “high-
risk” cardiovascular devices that 
were  approved  through  a  PMA 
application  between  2000  and 
2007,  less  than  one  third  had 
been subjected to a randomized 
trial.3 Only 5% of the devices had 
undergone two or more blinded, 
randomized studies.
The  Obama  administration 
would have been under pressure 
Modernizing Device Regulation
2 col
Cleared or approved
Not cleared or not approved
FDA Review Process
N
o
.
 
o
f
 
C
l
a
s
s
 
I
I
I
 
D
e
v
i
c
e
 
S
u
b
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
900
400
500
100
600
200
300
0
700
800
510(k) Original
PMA
Supplemental
PMA
N=342
N=217
N=784
AUTHOR:
FIGURE:
RETAKE:
SIZE
4-C H/T Line Combo
Revised
AUTHOR, PLEASE NOTE: 
Figure has been redrawn and type has been reset.
Please check carefully.
1st
2nd
3rd
Garber
1 of 1
ARTIST:
TYPE:
ts
04-01-10 JOB: 3621 ISSUE:
114
228
47
170
120
664
67%
Cleared 78%
Approved
85%
Approved
Decisions about Class III Device Submissions by the FDA in Fiscal Years 2003–2007, 
According to FDA Review Process.
The data pertain to FDA review decisions made through the 510(k) and premarket-
approval (PMA) processes from October 1, 2002, through September 30, 2007, for 
class III devices. Devices that were not cleared or not approved include 510(k) submis-
sions that the FDA found to be not substantially equivalent to a marketed device or that 
were withdrawn, as well as PMA submissions that were withdrawn; the FDA did not 
deny approval of any PMA submissions during this period. The FDA considers submis-
sions to be withdrawn voluntarily if the applicant is unable to provide the information 
necessary to support approval within 180 days. Adapted from a Government Account-
ability Office Medical Device Premarket Review based on FDA data.
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to  reevaluate  device  regulation 
even  if  the  Riegel  decision  had 
not  been  issued.  The  reevalua-
tion  is  now  an  urgent  priority. 
The recently issued strategic pri-
orities  of  the  FDA’s  Center  for 
Devices and Radiological Health 
indicate  that  improvements  in 
the review process will be high 
on the agenda.4 How might the 
FDA best approach its role as a 
device regulator?
A more rigorous device-approv-
al process — involving more se-
lective application of the 510(k) 
exemption and more consistent 
application  of  requirements  for 
well-designed trials of sufficient 
size and duration — would rem-
edy some of the problems iden-
tified by critics. If the PMA pro-
cess were more transparent and 
its specific requirements were ful-
ly elucidated in advance, it would 
also respond to industry’s criti-
cisms that it is unpredictable.
Nevertheless, a revised preap-
proval process is unlikely to solve 
all the problems posed by exist-
ing approaches to device regula-
tion. More rigorous preapproval 
studies cannot provide absolute 
assurances of long-term safety or 
effectiveness.  Risks  associated 
with devices that become evident 
only  after  months  or  years  of 
use would not be detected even 
in a more comprehensive premar-
keting evaluation. And more de-
manding evidence standards will 
raise the cost of bringing a prod-
uct to market — an obstacle that 
might be of limited importance 
for  large  device  companies  but 
could be insuperable for under-
capitalized start-up firms similar 
to those that have been the source 
of many device innovations.
Much more could be done to 
learn about experiences with de-
vices  after  they  are  approved. 
The  FDA’s  system  of  postmar-
keting surveillance has never been 
as comprehensive, even for drugs, 
as the agency would like. Follow-
up drug studies that the FDA de-
mands are not always completed, 
many are conducted or reported 
on long after the designated dead-
lines,5 and the FDA has limited 
ability to remove poor products 
from  the  market.  The  agency’s 
capabilities in the device arena 
are no greater; in fact, it is often 
more difficult to identify a device 
that has already been implanted 
in patients than it is to determine 
which drugs they have received.
Medical devices hold tremen-
dous potential for both good and 
harm. A modernized and more 
appropriate  approach  to  their 
regulation should not be limited 
to better preapproval evaluation. 
The payoff from increased invest-
ments  in  postapproval  studies 
would be substantial. The collec-
tion of postapproval data can be 
facilitated  through  the  pooling 
of  data  from  electronic  health 
records, which offers the oppor-
tunity for researchers and regula-
tors to learn from the experience 
of  large  numbers  of  patients, 
with far more extensive clinical 
detail  than  has  been  available 
from  observational  databases. 
Longer follow-up periods would 
enable the FDA to detect delayed 
benefits and harms. And studies 
based  on  real-world  experience 
would do a better job of evaluat-
ing effectiveness for typical pa-
tients. This is the right time to 
institute a more comprehensive 
approach to the postapproval mon-
itoring and analysis of the safety 
and effectiveness of medical de-
vices.
Disclosure forms provided by the author 
are available with the full text of the article 
at NEJM.org.
From the Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health 
Care System, Palo Alto; and the Center for 
Primary Care and Outcomes Research and 
the Center for Health Policy, Stanford Uni-
versity, Stanford — both in California.
This article (10.1056/NEJMp1000447) was 
published on March 24, 2010, at NEJM.org.
Food and Drug Administration. Overview  1. 
of device regulation. 2010. (Accessed March 
11,  2010,  at  http://www.fda.gov/Medical 
Devices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
Overview/default.htm.)
Mundy A, Favole JA. FDA rips approval of  2. 
medical device. Wall Street Journal. Septem-
ber 25, 2009:A4.
Dhruva SS, Bero LA, Redberg RF. Strength  3. 
of study evidence examined by the FDA in 
premarket approval of cardiovascular devic-
es. JAMA 2009;302:2679-85. [Erratum, JAMA 
2010;303:422.]
Center for Devices and Radiological Health.  4. 
CDRH FY 2010 strategic priorities. Washing-
ton, DC: Food and Drug Administration, 2010. 
(Accessed  March  11,  2010,  at  http://www 
.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/Centers 
Offices/CDRH/CDRHVisionandMission/
UCM197648.pdf.)
Independent  evaluation  of  FDA’s  Pre- 5. 
scription Drug User Fee Act — evaluations 
and initiatives: CDER technical support and 
analysis: final report on the PMR/PMC back-
log review. Washington, DC: Food and Drug 
Administration, 2009. (Accessed March 11, 
2010,  at  http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory 
Information/Post-marketingPhaseIV 
Commitments/UCM181135.pdf.)
Copyright © 2010 Massachusetts Medical Society.
Modernizing Device Regulation
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org at HARVARD UNIVERSITY on December 16, 2013. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 2010 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 